Andriy Shkil, a former Batkivshchnya (BYuT) MP of the previous parliament, has been refused asylum by the Czech Republic, a nation well known for granting asylum via the historical legacy of Vaclav Havel who rarely turned an application down.

Why did the Czech Republic refuse his application for asylum?

The answer lays within the Schengen Visa system.

Although free to travel anywhere within the Schengen area once a Ukrainian has a Schengen Visa, they have to enter and egress the Schengen zone via the specific nation that granted the Visa.  If Poland granted the Visa, a Ukrainian who wanted to visit Italy for example, would have to travel there and back via Poland.

Personally I don’t know a Ukrainian who isn’t aware of the rules – although undoubtedly there will be some.

Logic would dictate, following on from such basic rules, that if an individual is going to claim asylum somewhere within the EU, that also will necessarily need to occur in the nation that issued the Visa, rather than seeking asylum in any EU nation an individual may take a fancy to.  Ultimately, a nation issuing a Schengen Visa must have some responsibility for their decision to grant – or not – an individual entry, for it is their decision and not that of any other Schengen area state who may well have made a different decision.

And so, in a way, it is rather comical that a one-time parliamentarian – an individual supposedly bright enough to have been trusted in creating and supporting – or not – Ukrainian legislature, has tried to claim asylum in the Czech Republic on a Schengen Visa issued by France.

Naturally, had Mr Shkil been reelected to the current parliament, he would not be seeking asylum anywhere but enjoying the immunity and impunity being an MP brings – and the fact he is not in parliament today it is not because he was beaten in any constituency seat, but rather due to his very lowly place on the Batkivshchnya Party list when it comes to proportional representation.

The Ukrainian electoral system is a mixed electoral system where 50% of MPs are those who take office through what is officially called Single Member District Plurality (or First Past The Post as most would recognise it), and 50% of MP seats are in parliament due to how high they are placed on their party list vis a vis the percentage of the vote their party gets.

Naturally all the top places on party lists go to the leaders to insure their place in parliament without having to go through the rigors of actually standing against another in the first past the post system in a constituency seat – as they may lose and that would never do!

Placed at 87 on the Batkivshchyna Party list, either Mr Shkil was not willing to pay enough to those who make the party lists to be placed higher, or he was such a poor performer during his tenure that his placing was deliberately done to insure he would not return to parliament.  Given the high number of poor performers on most party lists, he was either simply out bid or truly useless beyond comprehension.

Anybody on party lists lower than position 50 are in a precarious position and are certainly not assured of representing a party in parliament.  87th on a party list is a clear signal you will not get your nose in the RADA trough.

Even if we look at the ways of manipulating the proportional representation part of the vote, 87th place would simply not have been high enough to reasonably expect a return to the RADA.

If we look at the independent form of mixed electoral systems, then the 50% of first past the post seats run completely separately and in parallel to the proportional representation 50%.  This system can lead, for example, to a party winning all the constituency seats and then half of the 50% of seats allocated by proportional representation – thus giving a party 75% of the parliamentary seats.

Alternatively there is the dependent mixed electoral system, whereby proportional representation places parameters on the system, thus is therefore somewhat dominant over first past the post.  For example if a party wins 40% of the national vote, then their party members who win their seats through the first past the post constituency elections take their seats, followed by a remainder from the party list until it reaches the 40% of the popular vote it won.

Yes there are occasions under the dependent system whereby a party may win more seats in the first past the post constituency seat elections, than it should hold under its share of the proportional vote count.  Should that be the case, these “overhanging” seats in excess of the proportional vote are honoured and the parliament extends to accommodate the additional MPs for that session – whilst everybody else is represented by their proportional share of the vote.

None of this would have helped Mr Shkil at such a lowly place on the Batkivshchnya Party list – and neither would manipulating the size of voting districts – as Ukraine, for the purposes of its proportional representation, is seen as one big district rather than allocations on a proportional basis by Oblast (county) level.

Quite simply, the smaller the district, the smaller the number of proportional seats available, and thus the higher the percentage of the vote needed to win a seat.  The larger the district, the more proportional seats available, the lower the percentage of the vote needed to win a seat – not rocket science (albeit political science summed up by the formula X  1/(X+1)).

Anyway, enough of that academic waffle – Mr Shkil is now in France duly seeking asylum there.  The question is, will France grant it given that it is not normally that accommodating compared to the Czech Republic – a nation that was obviously Mr Shkil’s first choice when submitting his asylum application.

Firstly and in a move lauded by Human Rights Watch, the decision to approve easier access and dispensing of pain killing drugs such as morphine to terminally ill people was approved.

“This is a major advance, ensuring that Ukraine’s drug policy addresses the legitimate needs for medical opiates for pain relief.  Tens of thousands of patients who are in pain will benefit from this reform.” – Diederik Loham, Human Rights Watch

Some pain relief for a nation all too often decried for its human rights issues.

Thus it should have been a good day for those within the Health Ministry, and in particular the Health Minister Raisa Bogatyryova.

Raisa Bogatyryova

However whilst Human Rights Watch was quite properly lauding the aforementioned decision, the cancer called corruption, a systemic disease that cannot have the pain dulled by morphine, was simultaneously being called to account in relation to the Health Ministry by the RADA.

With the Communist Party unusually siding with the opposition, a vote was taken and passed to create a parliamentary committee and inquiry into corruption within the Health Ministry and opaque purchases of UAH 203.48 million of drugs from certain companies.

One has to strongly suspect that once the biopsy of the opaque drug purchases has been made, more than a hint of corruption will be found in the system of the Health Ministry.

The question then arises over whether the infected parts can or will be efficiently surgically removed and if so, whether remission will be a long lasting result.

Sadly, I fear not!

There has to be a reason to pay up to $5 million to get onto the “party list” and allocated a seat in the RADA after all – and $5 million is the price of a RADA seat offered to my good lady by BYuT in 2007, despite her absolute loathing and complete and utter disinterest in politics.

That $5 million, the sales pitch goes, will be quadrupled at least during a 5 year parliamentary term – an excellent return on investment.  A mere $100,000 would buy a seat in the regional legislature, which although not adding multiple millions in return for your investment, would certainly leave her a $ millionaire at the end of any term.

Naturally anything she did not want to declare could be assigned to my name and the usual annual income return for public officials farce would continue with all declaring an absolute pittance in comparison to the real incomes – something that still happens today due to hiding wealth, assets and income via family members amongst other shenanigans.

However, this may well be about to change.

Bill 2837 was submitted on 14th April 2013 which will go some considerable way to changing and limiting the ways of hiding real earnings and personal worth for politicians and state officials.

Granted it may not stop the shenanigans any more than tax avoidance laws gather in more tax – avoidance systems simply become more complex.

However, this bill is jointly drafted by Petrenko, Chumak, Tigipko and Mahnitski – 4 MPs form different parties amongst the 5 of relevance in the RADA.  Thus with cross-party authors there should be enough cross-party support to get this bill through its first reading which is due immanently.

It is quite a radical bill in terms of the transparency it may bring about in comparison to the current opaque methodology.

There is a citizens corruption  register (open to all citizens), big changes in the amount of, and reporting methods relating to, expenses paid for by the public purse, and perhaps most interestingly, the incomes and assets of public officials and their family members must be reported – including those family members who do not live with the public officials a favoured way of hiding personal worth of the officialdom.

Now it maybe that this bill will not change much in respect to actual transparency once ways to circumvent it have been discovered and organised – however it will be interesting to see if the bill will be adopted given the spirit in which it has obviously been drafted and the attempt at transparency it intends to install.

I expect it to pass, despite the fact it is not perfect having read it.

If true, a significant step forwards in the eyes of the EU one suspects, as it deletes one of a list of pending cases against her.

However, if true, very little has been said about it publicly by anybody – and you would expect the opposition parties to broadcast such a matter loudly – if only to undermine the abilities and motivations of the Prosecutors Office in the eyes of the public.

At least you would expect such an opposition cacophony unless there is a deliberate political move to distance themselves from the personality Ms Tymoshenko and the circus that surrounds it – and reasons for that there are a-plenty.  That is perhaps much easier to do now Sergey Vlasenko, her lawyer/defence council, is no longer a Batkivshchnya MP.

Hopefully corroboration from sources external and unconnected  to the Batkivshchyna Party will come soon enough, putting an end to yet another poor decision by the PGO of Ukraine.

But democracy is a very complex structure, and a list of its defining features would be very lengthy indeed.

Less often do we read about democracy needing to be habitual and tolerant.

For any democracy to consolidate there are numerous factors of course, but habit and tolerance are extremely important ingredients – not just recognised and mutually assured by and between the political elite, but also by the society which underpin any democracy if it is ever to consolidate.

It is far easier to change the habits and tolerances of a political party, or the political strata, than it is to change the habits and tolerances of society quickly.

If a political party or the political elite generally, are institutionalised, complex and coherent then internal change is swift – at least in comparison to the speed of societal change, more often than not.

Thus democratic habit and tolerances need to be clearly and robustly displayed amongst the political elite, consistently and over an extended period of time to assist in any changing of societal habit and tolerance.

Democracy after all, is a system in a state of continual friction between opposing/differing ideas, policies, ideologies etc.  Thus it demands tolerance for it to work effectively.  It demands habit for longevity and consolidation.

It is therefore very sad to read that apparently Svoboda MPs and party officials were at the forefront of what is most definitely a display of intolerance during the Ternipol Victory Day celebrations, that according to the account in the link above, prevented veterans from marking the end of WWII with any  degree of reverence and dignity – as those across the rest of European continent and Ukraine managed to do, if they so wished.

Perhaps of even greater sadness following this incident, there are as yet no words of condemnation from the Svoboda leadership, or the other parties in the opposition coalition with Svoboda – all of whom – including Svoboda – claim to be the “democratic opposition” and/or fighting for a democratic Ukraine.

Perhaps it is necessary to point out to the opposition parties of Ukraine, that in a democratic Ukraine, old men and women would be free to mark the end of WWII with dignity and reverence – whether they like them doing so or not!

“First of all, we have never postponed the deadline for Kyiv. Foreign ministers of the EU countries in December clearly stated that they would be ready to sign the association agreement at a summit in Vilnius in November. However, they specified three sectors, in which they expect decisions from Ukraine through consistent and obvious efforts,in particular selective justice, the program of reforms and flawed electoral laws.

We see some progress the Ukrainian side made in all the three sectors, including politically motivated proceedings. The release of Lutsenko and Fylypchuk  is a step in the right direction. However, much is to be done, including the guarantee that this phenomenon won’t happen again.”

A statement they may seem rather bullish – but in reality is actually dictated by the electoral timetables of several EU Member States and European Parliament elections due to occur in late 2013, 2014 and 2015, events that naturally divert attention away from issues Ukrainian and concentrate EU attention of “the self” and its component parts.

Simply put, no matter how bullish the statement of Fule may appear,  if the agreement is not signed in November, the European political calendar simply dos not allow for any such signing until 2015 at the earliest.  Any later than November and there will be significant political actors that if not at the end of a legitimate domestic mandate, are just finding their feet under a recently acquired domestic public mandate – issues of legitimacy and all that!

However, all that aside, I am not aware of any serious requests from Ukraine to extend the November deadline anyway – which causes one to ponder the need for such a statement from Fule – other than keeping the pressure for reform momentum on, and forcing the majority and minority in parliament to work together at least over matters EU.

What is true is that the court found serious fault with the old criminal code to which Ms Tymoshenko was subjected – a code no different to that employed to imprison the vast majority of the thousands of Ukrainians who also sit in prison today.

There was little doubt that serious fault would be found – otherwise why would the current Ukrainian government and parliament have created a new criminal code which finds far more favour with the European community?

Successive Ukrainian governments have known the old code to be seriously flawed – as did, undoubtedly, Ms Tymoshenko when she was Prime Minister only a few years ago.

Neither does it comment on her guilt or innocence for the matters over which she was prosecuted as some have inferred.

However such is the extent to which supporters and detractors have stretched far beyond what is actually written that somewhat unusually this statement was made by the ECfHR.

In short, the political motivations – or not – behind her trail and detention are not – yet at least – subjected to an ECfHR comment.  That is not what this ruling was about.

In several months, when her next case judgment is made, the issue of political motivation or selective justice may – or may not – be mentioned by the ECfHR – however it would perhaps have been far more circumspect to keep ones powder dry relating to that particular issue until that date if the opposition are to try to motivate and mobilise the public using the ECfHR as a driver.

Unfortunately, having made statements to the effect that the ECfHR stated Ms Tymsohenko was a political prisoner on the day of the judgment release, for that to then be refuted by Roderick Liddell of the ECfHR on 7th May, does not do much for the credibility of the opposition.

All the ECfHR ruling actually does (removing Ms Tymoshenko from the picture) is confirm to the Ukrainian public that the old criminal code was arbitrary, unfair, less than transparent, legislatively flawed in protecting by human rights and procedural normative – and that is not news to the Ukrainian public who lived under it for decades.

Fortunately, as the current government created a new criminal code to replace the old one under which Ms Tymoshenko was processed because it was so flawed, they will find it very difficult to appeal the ECfHR ruling whilst lauding their new criminal code as a major step forwards.

Anyway, far more interesting will be the Tymoshenko ruling due in a few months time – and whether political persecution or selective justice will be mentioned by the ECfHR in its ruling.

What became immediately apparent, if it wasn’t already clear before, is that Ukraine has decided that it can become a gas hub for the European continent and intends to pursue that strategy, making the most of its gas transport system and more particularly its vast underground gas storage facilities (50 billion cubic meters).

The infrastructure, whilst somewhat decrepit and thus in need of some serious investment, does at least exist already.

Very good – and an obvious goal to pursue given the soviet legacy Ukraine inherited.

But then there is the widely talked about “resource curse” to consider should Ukraine actually achieve its aim of both Black Sea Shelf and fracking production, transit and storage.  It may very well turn into an oil and (mostly) gas State.

Quite possibly a very good thing for the Ukrainian economy, GNI and indeed citizen income as well.

But at what social cost?

Of all 23 nations on the planet where 60% or more of GDP is derived from oil and gas – not a single one can be classed as a democracy.

Further all are very corrupt, almost completely unresponsive to the demands of their populations and have extremely low accountability amongst the political elite.

Looking at the Human Development Index which is a key identifier when it comes to identifying liberal consolidated democracies, almost all oil and gas States with 60% of GDP coming from those sources have extremely low HDI scores regardless of citizen wealth and GNI per capita.

That is not to say a low HDI score prevents democracy, of the bottom 46 ranking nations in HDI, 13 can be deemed a democracy of sorts and 2 of those, as liberal democracies.

Looking at the top 25 HDI scoring nations, only Singapore is not a democracy – and from the top 40 HDI scoring nations they are all democracies less Singapore and a few small oil and gas States (Qatar, UAE etc.)

Thus becoming an energy producing exporter and hub may well have dire consequences for an already “feckless” (per academic definition) political system in Ukraine.

One of the best ways to identify an effective and consolidated democracy seems to be to take the Freedom House score and multiply it by the World Bank anti-corruption score, and more often than not it closely mirrors the HDI position in the HDI league table – Spooky!

In fact, discounting the Islamic world, there is a very strong correlation between democracy, freedoms and any HDI score a nation has.

So becoming an energy producer and energy hub as planned will destine Ukraine to the usual fate of oil and gas dominant GDP nations with regards to democracy?

Well, not necessarily.

“Feckless” as the Ukrainian politics are and have been historically, there is nothing to prevent the current “feckless democracy” of Ukraine moving to a consolidated effective and possibly liberal democracy prior to the full  realisation of the energy producing/energy hub plan.  Should that movement to an effective and consolidated democracy occur prior to, or even simultaneously with the “energy plan”, then all may bode very well for democracy in Ukraine.

A very smart scholar named Przeworski has proven that (again removing the Islamic world from the equation) should the personal purchasing power of a nation reach a certain monetary figure (currently about $10,000, but a figure that needs to be index linked to remain relevant), then no democracy has ever crumbled.

In effect with a diversified economy and the average purchasing power per capita of $10,ooo or more, democracy is not only consolidated but invincible to the challenges of other governance models due to the middle class/ independent bourgeoisie.

Ergo, empirical evidence and academic works from the likes of Lipset, Prezeworski, Welzel and Ingehart etc, would all point towards the necessity of moving Ukraine’s currently “feckless politics” to an effective democracy whilst simultaneously trying to reach $X personal purchasing power and climbing the HDI league table if democracy is to survive any significant oil and gas increased share of the Ukrainian GDP.

The question is can the feckless political system stop being feckless before it leads Ukraine into the black hole of the resource cursed nations?  Looking at the entire Ukrainian political landscape and personalities within, that seems very unlikely without consistent external pressure and guidance.

All in all, an obvious and achievable plan for Ukraine – with very scary possible outcomes should it succeed.

That is perhaps understandable given some EU leaders insistence upon her release to guarantee the signing of the EU/Ukraine Association Agreement in November at the Vilnius Summit.  Other EU leaders would prefer to march on and sign the agreement whether she be free or not.  A not uncommon state division over policy EU foreign policy affairs it has to be said.

A few days ago, I wrote about the prospects of a Tymoshenko release after the official recognition of an all female MP plea, during the Orthodox Easter and why such timing would be no bad thing.

As I wrote, that petition was sent to the Pardons Committee.

Since then Prime Minister Azarov has stated that her pardoning cannot occur until all pending court cases have been heard – which is completely untrue.  She can of course be pardoned for those offences of which she has been found guilty already – albeit other cases in the judicial arena are bound to carry on until guilt or innocence is found.

For Prime Minister Azarov, it make make bureaucratic sense for all her pending cases to come to whatever conclusion they may prior to any pardoning – but that is not how the rule of law, Pardons Committee nor human rights work.  More to the point, the Prime Minister does not consider or grant pardons and therefore his opinion should be seen only as that – despite his position.

The system indeed allows for her to be pardoned at any time for the offences she has been found guilty of – regardless of any pending legal proceedings despite what Mr Azarov states.

In fact, the Pardons Committee is due to consider the aforementioned all female MP plea on 29th April, and following on from yesterday’s entry where I pondered just how fast ECfHR fast-tracked cases actually move, I now discover that the ECfHR ruling is supposedly due on 30th April – giving Ukraine the opportunity to grant her pardon prior to what is likely to be a rather pointed judgment from the ECfHR in favour of her release over procedural issues that fall well below the expected European normative.

In short Ukraine internally has the opportunity to recommend and grant her release immediately prior to the ECfHR ruling,  thus taking much the sting and media interest out of that particular tail, whilst also being seen by much of the domestic audience to meet the symbolic motivations due to the Orthodox Easter.

Of course regardless of the Pardons Committee recommendations (if in favour of a release), or the ECfHR ruling, Ms Tymoshenko may remain in jail anyway pending any Ukrainian appeal against said ruling.

Nevertheless, perhaps the planets are indeed aligning for an Orthodox Easter pardon – which I have mentioned many times, would not surprise me should it occur.

That said, as I have written before, if Tymoshenko is not released before or during the RADA summer recess then I seriously doubt that she will be before 2016 – thus it is unlikely any deal will be signed and everyone will have to resort to Plan B – the quiet implementation of parts of the DCFTA most expedient to both sides.

In fact it doesn’t affect anybody I know either.

It will undoubtedly affect some readers however – both currently and in the future.

It seems that the State Employment Centre has made assurances that the current (and no doubt overly bureaucratic) systems for granting work permits and temporary resident status (for the purposes of work) are going to be simplified – requiring far less documentation than currently is required – especially so as far as renewals/extensions are concerned, and which will subsequently be gratis if granted for those who have navigated the bureaucratic circus before.

They also state that consideration is being given to raise the duration of such permits from 1 year to 3 years.

A particularly good idea should the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and DCFTA actually be signed – as not only will foreign confidence increase (to a greater or lesser degree) relating to entering the Ukrainian market at an SME/entrepreneurial level, those who want to do so, may actually stand a reasonable chance of navigating the bureaucratic hurdles that prevent so many currently.

It is necessary of course, to see just how the bureaucracy will be reduced – if at all – and I suspect not at all, other than the more expedited time line requirement for the bureaucracy to function and process applications.

Which documents will be subsequently scrapped from the current list will be far more interesting, as currently some of the documentation required is the barrier to entry – rather than the business environment itself!

Best guess thus far is here.